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Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational? 
Lind a Marcin Akoff 
I would wager thac many women in philosophy understand inruitively chat there is a 
natural link berween feminism and philosophy.1 Michele LeDoeuff explains this as 
fol1ows. To be a feminise, she claims, is tO be "a woman who does not leave others to think 
for her. .. "2 This is the essential core of the feminist attitude, prior to the acceptance of 
any specific feminist theory or explanation of women's subordination. But on the basis 
of just this minimal core, LeDoeuff conjectures we can "make a link" between feminism 
and philosophy, building on the more general link between "chinking philosophically and 
self-assertion through thought." Given this association between the doing of philosophy 
and a certain kind of assertive subjectivity, or between philosophy's being and doing, it 
becomes clear that "'thinking philosophically' and 'being a feminist' appear as one and 
the same attitude: a desire to judge by and for oneself!'J 
However, despite this "natural" connection, within the profession at large th� 
attribution of an intrinsic connection between feminism andl philosophy more often 
produces cognitive dissonance. Feminism is (considered) a substantive set of empirical 
claims and political commitments. Philosophy is (considered) a discipline of thought 
organized by the pursuit of truth but uncommitted to any particular truth. To forego this 
separation by committing philosophy ir.self co some particular truth before it even begins 
its work is to risk inviting dogmatism. Therefore , philosophical reason must be kept prior 
co and primary over feminism. else feminism icself will be doomed to irracionalicy. 
Or so Martha Nussbaum has argued in a recent critique of feminist philosophy which 
appeared in The New Yark Review of Books. The flavor of this arrt:icle is anticipated in her 
opening epigram from Plato which states that there must ube a type of woman that loves 
philosophy, and another type that hates it."4 For Nussbaum, as well as for Plato, the 
deciding issue demarcating these "types of women" is their respect for and loyalty to 
reason. This is the main problem she has with much feminist philosophy: that it courts 
irrationalism by unreasonably associating patriarchy with philosophical reason and thus 
undermining what should be its own best ally in the effort to critique and counteract 
irrational sexist beliefs. In this paper I will try to allay these concerns, some of which arise 
from an equivocation over the word "reason," or a disagreement about its scope, a topic 
I will discuss in a moment. But I also want to place Nussbaum's specific (and legitimate) 
questions within a larger context involving philosophy's own legitimation narratives and 
its resistance to feminism, especially to feminist philosophy. 
This resistance has reached a discernible new stage in the level of attentive interrogation 
the mainstream is directing toward our work. We have been interrogated before, but 
mostly we have been ignored, puzzled over, chided, and sometimes ridiculed. The major 
research departments have by and large not included feminist philosophy in their course 
liscs, much less their required courses or comprehensive exam areas. We are by and large 
not cited or quoted by the leading (or dominant) writers in the discipline, even when our 
ideas are relevant to and supportive of theirs. There are too many examples here to cite. 
(An especially stark example is Steve Fuller's 1988 Social Epistemology which focused on 
central themes feminists had worked on throughout the l 980's but neglected to cite a 
single feminist work. 5) After Annette Baier's ground breaking presidential address to the 
AP A a few years back, ground breaking as the first address which developed feminist 
themes, the (male) philosophers chat surrounded me in the audience were universally 
cold in their assessment, one of them expressing the general reaction : "Nice paper, but 
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no argument." ThlS, as we all know, lS the most devastatmg cnnci.sm a philosopher can 
make of another. 
Still, Annette Baier did become pres1denc of the APA. and she did read a paper 
developing feminist themes. Richard Rorry, a widelv read philosopher despite hLS 
iconoclasm, has recencly been quoting Marilyn Frye with approval. There are regular 
panels on feminisl philosophy at each of the APA divtS1on meetings. 
Several journals have had special issues on feminism, and have reviewed feminise 
boob. 
And though we are not at the ma1or research institutions yec, feminist phllosophers 
are gening jobs, in some cases good ones. 
These positive developments are causing anxiety in a variery of quarters. Some white 
male· job candidates feel threatened, and surprised that they would be threatened (I 
th.in1'), in a discipline they chink of as ruled by reason rather than "political correctness." 
Even established philosophers may feel some anxiety about what our agenda is in the 
profession, and to what extent it is directed at them. And the anxiety is noc restricted to 
men: perhaps feminism poses a greater immediate risk to women in the fie ld. Senior 
women .who work in fairly traditional areas may feel as if they are being implicitly 
criticized by this new area of work, e.g., that their work is not feminise enough or is the 
prod ucc of internalized oppression. In a conrexc where few if any women in our profession 
feel completely accepted by the discipline, a feminist presence can create cause for alarm: 
alarm about the projected guilt by association, or irritation at claims made about one that 
one has no sympathy for, or fear chat the derision off eminist work wU l cast a general dou be 
about women's ability to philosophize. I have experienced this myself. I was recently at 
a conference where another woman and I made a minority of two on a panel which 
included ten male speakers. After several hours of presentations and discussion, a woman 
from the audience spoke up, rather heatedly, to chastise the men for not listening co me 
and the other woman, for not even "looking at us as we spoke." I felt patemalized by this 
intervention, annoyed by what I believed was an overhasty judgment-call and the face 
that she hadn't approached us directly before speaking on our behalf in public. 
At the same time as I would critique some of the particular features of this small 
example of 11feminist intervention," I also know that my miffed reaction was partly due 
to my own embarrassment: I wanted to pretend that everything at the conference was 
fine, that my work was being given equal and fair consideration, and that the male 
colleagues with whom I was working were trustworthy and impartial. It would be 
personally painful to think otherwise, and awkward and difficult to raise such criticisms 
publicly. So part of my reaction to this speaker from the audience was also based on a 
resistance against the possibility that she was right. 
Reactions to feminism often harbor both these sorts of elements-legitimate criticism 
alongside anxiety-driven resistance-without their being distinguished. We need to 
initiate some collective processes of group self-reflection in order to better identify which 
reaction is which. And we must realize that it would be foolish co aim toward the 
elimination of all anxious resistance against the immense (yet also very personal} social 
changes and disciplinary evolutions that feminism has initiated. On the other hand, 
clearly it would be wrong to demand that feminist philosophers must somehow take 
responsibility for these anxieties, that we must reassure the boys that we are not anti­
male, that we aren't out to destroy the canon, or that we must stop analyzing gender so 
as not to make it look like women are only interested in the particular and never the 
universal, or even that we should stop calling our.selves feminists so that people won't 
confuse the whole of feminism with what we write. There are things that we should take 
3
Martin Alcoff: Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1996
Is the Feminise Critique of Reason Rational! 61 
responsibility for, of  course, and uppermost among these I would put the quality of our 
work, our intelleccual integrity and political accountability, and our responsibility to use 
any power we have co help other women in the profession overcome sexist obstacles to 
cheir development as philosophers (a motivation that, no doubt, inspired the woman I 
mentioned above). How we rinterpret these responsibilicies-how,e.g., we define 
"quality," and how we identify where responsibility devolves into paternalism-is of 
course subject to a debate which will never achieve final resolution. 
Feminist philosophy provokes panicularly anxious responses because its subject 
matter is not the ontological status of numbers or of mereological sums but the status of 
women, with necessarily implicit if not explicit judgments concerning how we have lived 
and how we should live in our private as well as public lives. It thus exposes nerves and 
challenges our constructions of self. And for women who are philosophers, that 
construction of self has no doubt incorporated to a significant degree some notions about 
our individual and perhaps collective capacity to reason, to wield that most important 
human capacity and to participate in the ongoing conversation guided by reason which 
we call philosophical thought. It is thus in the midst of these complicated and 
treacherous waters chat we must consider the debate over the feminist critique of reason. 
Sabina Lovibond has written another, perhaps more judicious essay on feminism and 
reason but which articulates some of the same concerns as Martha Nus.sbaum's essay.6 
Boch Nussbaum and Lovibond are concerned with feminise philosophy's relationship to 
philosophy, co the canon, and to the standard understandings of reason, argument, or 
what might be thought of as epistemic legitimation within the field. Both question 
whether feminism rightly criticizes the canon as fundamentally patriarchal, and they 
wonder if feminism can coherently critique philosophical methodology given that it must 
use that same methodology in its critique. And both are concerned that a feminist 
critique of philosophy and of reason may well undercut one of the primary strategies 
women have at our disposal to invalidate sexist beliefs. 
These are important and legitimate concerns, since they raise the key metaphilosophical 
challenges that feminise philosophy has put forward co the discipline. In particular, the 
feminist critique of reason challenges philosophy's self-understanding as a discipline of 
discourse primarily organized by the pursuit of truth (unlike, for example, literature, 
theology, rhetoric, or art). And key to this self-image is Plato's distinction between 
philosophy and sophistry, between philosophical argument governed by the pursuit of 
truth and rhetorical argument governed by the pursuit of persuasion or practical aims. 
Given this map, the demise o{ philosophical reason would seem to consign us to 
accepting that all discourses are reducible to strategies of power or manifestations of a 
desire ungoverned by rational standards. 
But if philosophy is truly truth-seeking, then how can we account for the exclusion, 
denigration, and repudiation of all things female throughout the history of our esteemed 
vocation? When Aristotle explains that women are deformed males, when Rousseau 
advises to consult women's opinions only in bodily matters and never in matters of 
morality or understanding, when Kant jokes that a woman who reasons might as well 
have a beard, and when Hegel likens the differences between males and females to those 
between animals and plants, where is the overriding concern with truth?7 Can the 
pattern discernible in these errors be explained as the result of an ignorance of some 
empirical fact? If the problem is a moral one, isn't it likely that the tradition of moral 
theory produced by these thinkers would show some trace of their ability to hold these 
attitudes towards their closest companions? And to the ex cent chat the moral disposition 4
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depended on some element of cognition, is it plausible to mamtain chac the theories of 
justifu:ation and of truth produced in tlus aadition were also unmune from an en tanglement 
with the need to justify these vitally unportant beliefs? 
The traditional account of sexism Vvithin philosophy has be.en thac H manifests only 
temporary lapses of reasoning abilicy, �d on whac Nussbaum calls .. blind spocs, the 
ignorance of fact, and the moral obtuseness" of a male,dominated academy. On her 
view, we can rectify these errors by gertmg on .. with the cough work of theorizing in a 
rigorous and thoroughgoing way" on philosophical issues concerning women, sex, and 
the family. "Ir is in this way and no other," Nussbaum claims, "char women in philosophy 
can go beyond the past achievements of males. '09 Reason will reveal the truth, if it is 
wielded consistently and rigorously. 
But as I have suggested, many feminist philosophers have argued that this move is 
premature. The first response to a survey of the "blind spots" on women in the canon 
should nor be simply new work on women using previous methods but must be a self, 
reflective, sel),critical one, on the pan of philosophy itself, in order to answer how it could 
be the case that, as LeDoeuff puts it, "where women are concerned the learned utter, and 
institutions let them utter, words which fall clearly below their own usual standards of 
validation. "10 How does this licensing of misogyny operate within canonical texts? What 
standards of validation permit the opportunist devolution of the usual standards when 
the subject is women? 
Nussbaum has rwo worries abouc chis move coward criciquing reason: (a) she worries 
that critiquing reason leads feminists to dispense with reason and thus toward an 
irrationalism that would relinquish the possibility of truth (a philosophical concern) ; (b) 
she also worries that without reason feminism will not be able to justify the feminist 
conclusions that she herself would suppon, and thus that feminism's political aims will 
be disabled {a political concern). My argument will be that these are legitimate but 
groundless concerns. 
Clearly one difficulty here concerns just exactly what is being talked about when we 
talk about reason. Nussbaum generally uses a very limited and narrow account of reason, 
involving no more than giving arguments and subjecting these to tests oflogical validity. 
I could say here, correctly, that no feminist philosopher would dispute the need for reason 
in chis minimal version, but there is more to the story. Feminists who are engaged in the 
critique of reason generally understand reason as involving more than logical validity to 
include conceptions of intellectual virtue, certain kinds of mental dispositions, and a 
variety of semi,conscious assumptions that work to identify what can count as an 
argument as well as what can count as relevant reasons toward its conclusion. For some 
contemporary philosophers, this larger notion of reason brings to mind tired Modernist 
debates over the quest for a faculty of reason which are today considered thankfully 
closed. On this view, the feminist critique would be essentially targetting a straw figure, 
or returning us to an outmoded project few continue to be interested in pursuing. 
However, the feminist critique of reason is not obsessing over an outdated conception 
of reason but revealing the implicit assumptions still operatilve in even the minimal 
conception of reason endorsed today. In other words, the idea of a radical break (or 
incommensurable paradigm shift) between Modernist concepts of Reason and modem 
accounts of reason is both implausible and in fact mistaken. The very endorsement of 
minimalism, which has been a vogue in both epistemology and metaphysics at  least since 
Quine, bespeaks a host of philosophical assumptions and a specific metaphilosophical 
orientation. For one thing, minimalism allows philosophers to believe they can transcend 
the quagmires of the Modernist debates with a simple change in definition, and avoid self, 5
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refl�ction over how those earlier assumptions were implicated in sexism and how they 
still inform current thinking. le is chis very refusal to engage in self-reflection over the 
political problems in chose earlier accounts that "'ill doom us to be repeatedly susceptible 
ro the same sort of errors. 
In order to adequately assess the feminist critique, then, a stubborn insiscence thac 
all chere is to reason is given in the miminal account will just get in the way. For the 
moment, let us define reason more broadly, and also more generally, as the conception 
of how we achieve sound judgments. This broad definition can then provide a bridge 
between the differenr discussions relevant to this debate. 
The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason is to historically 
situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the 
mainstream of philosophy itself. Serious and sustained philosophical discussion concerning 
the scope and limits of reason is usually dated from the 18th century. Kant's Cricique of 
Pure Reason, after all, developed the view that reason, knowledge, and in fact philosophy 
itself was limited by the intellectual and perceptual attnbutesof man, that our reasoning 
capacity provides as much a reflection on us as a window onto the world. The 
epistemological problems this acknowledgment raises were solved by Kant by claiming 
that the world we know is not a world in itself, or a world completely indifferent to human 
projects and concerns, but a world constituted in part by those concerns (thus Hilary 
Putnam takes Kant to be the original founder of his internal realism). 
In the nineteenth century, Hegel pushed this critique further to argue that knowledge 
and reason are also embedded within and marked by history, on the grounds that the 
constitutive categories identified by Kant are temporally located or indexed, and thus 
human knowledge is unable ever to totally surpass the horizon of its historical era. 
Neither philosophical puzzles nor their solutions have a timeless reach, and in fact many 
resolutions develop only through the historical evolution of social change. I read Marx 
as identifying a further fundamental qualifying condition for philosophy in material 
power, which he defined as forms of laboring practices, and relations of production. 
What this idea provided beyond Kant and Hegel was the truly revolutionary notion that 
philosophy could no longer be entrusted to discern and correct all of its own errors; it 
required external critique from other disciplines in order to reveal its ideological 
content. 
Nietzsche and Freud of course also contributed to the undermining of the rigid 
demarcation between abstract reason and the desiring body, with Nietzsche arguing that 
the !body is the fundamental source of all human thought and argument and Freud 
arguing that the rational ego maintains its autonomy over an arational desire only 
temporarily. The Frankfurt School made another important critique of the way in which 
reason's reflective and critical aspects were being dismantled under the conditions of a 
commodity culture that performs only instrumental, or means�end, calculations. This 
critique might also target the minimalist account of reason, if the latter works to preclude 
a critical reflection on philosophy's social effects. 
The feminist critique of reason can thus be thought of as contributing to this long 
tradition of philosophical autocritique but adding the original dimension of sexual 
difference. Feminists have argued that concepts of reason and knowledge. as well as 
those of man, history, and power, are reflections of gendered practices passing as 
universal ones. The problem is nor simply that men have been biased against women's 
capacity to be rational, but that, at least in modernity, reason has been defined in 
opposition to the feminine, such that it requires the exclusion, transcendence and even 
the domination of the feminine, of women, and of women's traditional concerns which 
6
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have been characterized as rhe sire of the ITTeducibly irranonal particular and corporeal. 
Moreover, as Genevieve Lloyd has poinced out, "feminuury itself has been partly 
constituted through such prouesses of excluston."11 Tius is how Kane is able to make 
rational his claim that the woman who reasons nught as well have a beard. It is our 
{supposed) irrarional. incuinve, and emononal characteristics that both define us as 
female and �e us capable of affirming men's "essential" superioricy. Like any ocher 
concept, rationalicy is defined by reference co some contrast, and the association 
between rationality and masculinity dictated that contrascing site as the female. 
The major facror in this masculinist fonnularion of reason has been mind,body 
dualism. From the time of Plato, reason was thought to enable the soul to reach a "'pure, 
and etemal...immortal and unchangeable" realm where truth dwells among the 
"divine ... and the wise," as Genevieve Lloyd explains. 12 "The senses, in contrast, drag the 
soul back to che reaJm of the changeable, where it "wanders about blindly, and becomes 
confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with rhe things that are ever 
changing.'" To achieve knowledge, Place concluded, "the god, Like rational s.oul should 
rule over the slave,like mortal body." He goes so far as to claim: 
We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of 
anything, we muse get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves 
with the soul by itself. le seems, co judge from the argument, that the wisdom 
which we desire and upon which we profess to have set our hearts will be 
attainable only when we are dead, and not in our lifetime.13 
The metaphysics of chis concept of reason required che control of the body, of its 
emotions, desires, and everyday concerns, in order to achieve the de cached oUJtlook from 
which the philosopher could ascend to the plane of the universal. Such a view, in various 
manifestations, made its way throughout rhe hisrory of western philosophy, through 
Aristotle, Auguscii.ne, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Rousseau, Hume, and even Kant. 
Though reason was portrayed as universal and neu tral precisely because it was bodiless, 
chis schema worked co justify the exclusion of women from the domains of the academy, 
of science, and of generally being accorded epistemic authoriry and even credibility. 
Even. Simone de Beauvoir, writing the inaugurating treatise of western feminise theory 
in this century, agreed with the claim char women were more prone to· corporeal 
intrusions than men, and her (in) famous solution was for women to refuse marriage and 
motherhood. 
It is precisely because of chis legacy that Genevieve Lloyd argued in 1984 chat a 
feminist project determined co gain for women the· realm of the "mind" will never work 
to overturn male supremacy. We cannot simply remove women from the sphere of the 
"body" and claim for ourselves the sphere of the "mind" and "reason" when these latter 
concepts have been constructed on the basis of our exclusion. Such a strategy would only 
participate in the violent erasure of women, cominuing the valorization of the masculine 
as the only gender that can achieve full humanity. Thus Lloyd warned that, "the 
confident affirmation that Reason 'knows no sex' may likewise be taking for realicy 
something which, if valid ar all, is so only as an ideal.. .lf there is a Reason genuinely 
common to all, it is something to be achieved in the future, nor celebrated in the 
present. " 14 
This raises the constructive question of how to reconceptualize reason toward 
bringing about that universal ideal. If women are to have epistemic credibility and 
authority, we need to reconfigure the role of bodily experience in the development of 
knowledge, as well as the relationship between public and private discourse, and the 
primacy of the propositional over the inarticulate.15 On the other hand, if reason can 7
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no longer be segregated from bodily experience, and if sexual difference mandaces a 
significant distinction between male and female lxxlily experiences, must we forego the 
goal of a universal reason? Rosi Braidotti. one of the philosophers that Lovibond 
critiques, suggescs that we need to "elaborate a truth which is not removed from the body, 
reclaiming [our) body for [ourselves) ... [We need]\ to develop aad transmit a critique 
which respects and bears the trace of the intensive, libidinal force that sustains it. "16 
Given the irremediable material reality of sexual difference. can we universali:e the body 
to which truth is always connected? 
This is just the sort of question that makes Nussbaum think feminist philosophy is 
embracing the irrational. For Braidoni, the radical problems in the canon require 
correspondingly radical responses. But Nussbaum calls chis blaming of the philosophical 
tradi1tion for patriarchal ideas a &ench,inspired (read: implausible) reduction of reasoned 
discourse to "the play of social and political forces." Nussbaum argues that feminist 
philosophers fallaciously conclude from the fact that "the philosophical tradition has 
existed alongside patriarchal and oppressive institu'tions" that philosophy is co blame for 
these "abuses."17 Given this view, for Nussbaum the history of philosophy provides no 
motivation for such radical revisions as Braidotti is willing to entertain. 
I will address Nussbaum's concern about the "french,inspired" feminist reduction of 
philosophy to ideology in a moment, but it should be clear from the synopsis I gave above 
that the canon is not attributed blame by feminists simply because it existed alongside 
patriarchy, but because patriarchal ideas are found rife within. It is interesting to 
compare the canonical quotes I lifted to the ones Nussbaum uses in her essay to support 
her claims about the usefulness of the canon precisely for feminism: she cites Mill's 
argument for women's liberation, Plato's against the use of convention to maintain 
women's exclusion from sports, and Aristotle's emphasis on the role of emotion in 
pracrical reasoning. These are all genuinely positive examples, while mine were all 
negative. Which of these secs of examples represent the canon's fundamental essence? 
The unchallenged position on this when I was in school was that those embarrassing 
ruminations on women's inferiority and slaves' slavishness and so on that one would 
inevitably come :across in philosophers' as diverse as Augustine and Kierkegaard 
represented relative trivialities, asides rather than central theses, and thus were 
unrepresentative of the thrust of western philosophical thought .. This explanation then 
justified the fact that these passages lay unattended to, passed over in class except 
perhaps to joke about in ways that were usually discomforting (as if painful sexism was 
simply funny) , but never examined for their relationship to the central ideas of the text. 
What much of feminist philosophy has argued is that there is an intrinsic relationship, 
as Lloyd has amply demonstrated, between these sexist asides and the main account 
given of reason as well as the predominance of mind,body dualism and other dominant 
themes in the history of philosophy. To acknowledge this does not encourage a book 
burning party, nor does it in any way prohibit us from mining the canon for the counter 
themes as Nussbaum suggests. But it does justify just such a thorough and comprehensive 
critique of the canon as feminist philosophers have initiated. Before we blithely 
announce that the tradition is more often than not friendly to anti;sexist thought, we 
needJ a careful interrogation of what it contains, and this critical project is still in its initial 
stages.18 
However, I agree with Nussbaum on a very important point, which is that feminist 
philosophy cannot entirely forego the recourse to reason, objectivity, and truth. A 
collapse of knowledge to ideology or a refusal to characterize the source of the epistemic 
authority and privilege of one's own claims is only an avoidance of the implicit 8
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eplStemological assumptions m femuust and tn any ocher antHdeological arguments. 
The actempt codevLSe a merely strategtc deftnmon of truth "'111 always end m mcoherence 
given that what gives a truth claim its straceg1c results 15 preClseiy chac It LS seen a� noc 
merely a strategic claim.19 And there is no quesuon that femmLSt ph1losophv boch appeals 
co and uses reason and truth m the formulat1on and 1uscif1Cacion of its positions. 
ThLS is one of the cencral quesrioru raised by Sabma Lovibond in her critical appraisal 
of Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz. Lovibond offers a more accurate charactenzanon of the 
general critique of reason as caused by the "confromauon becween the thmking subject 
and the fact of hLS own rnatenally condmoned status.".?C And she is more inclined than 
Nussbaum ro recogmze the seriousness of chis confrontanon and its deep phiilosoph1cal 
implications. Nussbaum, by contrast, thmk.s reason is fine as it is except for the 
denigration of emotioru, but she neglects to explore whether the denigration of emotions 
is connected co fundamental aspects of the standard account of rationality. 
However, while Lovibond takes seriously the need for critique, she distinguishes 
between cwo ways to go abouc such a critique--one reformisc and one radical-and 
argues that the Lauer cannot avoid self�contradiction and irracionalism. These categories, 
of the reformist and the radical feminist position on reason (and on philosophy) are 
originally developed in Braidocci's Patcem.s of Dissonance (and to some extent also 
correspond to the distinction Nussbaum lifts from Plato concerning women who hate 
philosophy and women who love ir). According, then, to both lovibond and Braidotti, 
the reformist position avoids "an all-0ut attack on 'rationality' and relaced concepts, 
preferring instead to engage in local, piecemeal critical enquiries into the effects of the 
sexual power structure on philosophy ... ", and is associated with the work of Lorraine 
Code, Genevieve Lloyd, and Michele LeDoeuff. 21 The radical position, by contrast, has 
given up trying to correct or improve reason because it sees reason as fundamentally 
flawed by its "complicity with the sexual power structure.,,22 This position argues instead 
for the replacement of reason by a feminine symbolic, and can be found in the work of 
Braidotti herself, Elizabeth Grosz (and, I would think, Luce lrigaray). 
The fundamental argument for the radical over the reformist position, according co 
Lovibond, is that the reformist naively believes reason can be perfected, that the limits 
a material context and embodied subject places on reason can be overcome, as if with 
enough therapy we could eventually achieve complete self-knowledge and eliminate all 
unconscious influences. Given the fu tility of this goal, Lovibond reads Braidotti as 
holding that no progress is possible, that is, no progress in an epistemic or rational sense. 
The insight of psychoanalysis (which heavily informs Braidotti's approach) is that a 
cohe·rent self is an impossibility. and co the extent that reason assumes that we can at lease 
potentially know what we are doing and that we can subject both our practices and our 
beliefs to self-correcting reasoned critique, reason is itself based on a mistaken ontology. 
Lovibond criticiles Braidotti for this view by pointing out all the places in Braidotti's 
text where she appeals to coherence, legitimacy, faulty reasoning, and even the 
recalcitrance of reality in her critique of the reformist positions. Braidotti's rejection of 
reformism explains why she never attempts to reconstruct notions of truth, justification, 
and normativity, a problem Lovibond suggests is thematic in feminist philosophy. If no 
progress is thought to be possible in a rational or epistemic sense, then such projects of 
reconstruction are a waste of time. 
On this point I would agree with what I take to 'be Lovibond's position that feminists 
or anyone else are mistaken who believe that epistemic and normative reconstructions 
are impossible once we let go of foundationalism and essentialism and acknowledge that 
we will always be both "conditioned and free."23 And I would argue further that all 
9
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discourses invoh·e exclusions and standards of adequacy. which should be e'.\.'Plicitl · 
developed and defended rather than left implicit and assumed. But I would add a note 
of caution here in assessing feminism's self-explications. No discourse stands in a 
vacuum or addresses an undifferentiated universe ; each discourse, and especiall · 
discourses of legitimation, are addressing specific textual traditions concerning the 
possibilities oflegitimacion. Which is simply another way of saying that arguments, and 
not only subjects, are historically and socially situated. Do feminists need to address the 
arguments of anti-feminists in order to legitimate their position? Do we need to appeal 
co the standards of legitimation dominant in our universe of discourse which are thooe 
precisely used against feminism? I don't mean to imply here that I think textual 
traditions and standards of legitimation or discourses generally are incommensurable 
entities, without overlapping elements upon which co base communication. But what 
we h.ave to legitimate and on what basis we might develop a legitimation argument 
depends on where we stand, who we choose co speak co, who we want co convince, whose 
judgment is important to us. I would say that, while feminist philosophy does need to 
address its own implicit legitimation appeals, the way in which it chooses to address these 
may well not be acceptable or even recognizable from the perspective of the dominant 
discourse. This does not entail relativism, but simply chat mainstream justificatory 
standards are neiither hegemonic nor timeless. 24 
The main question I wane co raise in regard to Lovibond's account is whether che 
reformist�radical distinction holds. This quesrion was prompted by my realization that, 
if the distinction does hold, then some arguments I have been making and positions I 
thought I held are actually incoherent. For I like the so-called refom1iscs a great deal: 
I am constantly quoting and teaching Genevieve Uoyd and Michele LeDoeuff, and I also 
like Code's work and Lynn Nelson's and I have recommended Helen Longino's Science 
and Social Knowledge to every one of my colleagues. There is no question that these are 
methodologically conservative works, and I will even admit that that is part of their 
attraction for me: they are careful, detailed, not grandiose in their claims, doing their 
utmost to produce a productive dialogue with the traditions (in epistemology and 
philosophy of science). On the other hand, I also find myself delighting in and even in 
fundamental agreement with the most radical feminist texts: Braidotti1s1 Grosz's, 
lrigaray's. These authors are much less concerned about dialoguing with the dominant 
traditions in philosophy, much more likely to castigate the whole canon as inherently 
phallocentric, and they justify their irreverence on the grounds that we need to develop 
(precisely as Lovibond quotes Braidotti) a feminine symbolic. 
So am I incoherent? Is this perhaps explainable on the psychological level that I truly 
believe in reasoned argument and empirical evidence but find the irreverent attacks 
more therapeutic or cathartic in expressing my "unreasoned female rage"? 
I shy from that conclusion (indeed, it makes me anxious) . I believe char the 
distinction between these two groups which would imply their fundamental 
incompatibility, especially on the question of reason, is unfounded, and I also believe 
that the imputation of incompatibility is connected to the separation Plato made 
between philosophy and rhetoric. Before I explain this please be clear that I am not 
arguing a defense of all and any claims made by the feminists I have mentioned, or thac 
all and any of their various positions can be made consistent with each other. On some 
points I disagree with all of them. Nor is my aim simply to smooth over internal feminist 
differences so that we can all be friends.25 Rather, what I am arguing for is a way to 
understand the broad contours of a feminise critique of reason as a coherent and 
defensible research program, which is different than a particular theoretical commitment. 
10
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Remember, aher all, the passage from Lloyd I quored earlier: 
"the conf1denc affirmation thac Reason 'knows no sex' may hkew�se be 
cahng for rea11ry somethll1g which. J valid ac all. is so only as an ideal.. .If 
there is a Reason genuinely common to all, H tS somethm.g to be adueved in 
the future, not celebrated in the present. ":6 
These are not the words of someone who believes that reason is basteally fme as H is 
currently conceived, nor of someone who holds that progress LS inevicable. Racher. che 
passage implies the position that the dominanc understanding of reason needs fundamencal 
critique and rraosformation, very far from Nussbaum's attempt to protect reason as the 
tool beyond which there is no appeal and without which the forces of oppression cannot 
be held off. 
Moreover, look again at the passage I quoted from Braidotti: 
How are women to elaborate a truth which is not removed from the body, 
reclaiming their body for themselves? How are women to develop and 
rrarum�t a critique which respects and bears the trace of the intensive , 
libidinal force chac sustains ic? What must women do to keep truth nor 
ossified but alive ?27 
Braidotci does not shrink here from using the word truth or articulating a project chat 
involves epistemic progress, that is, the elaboration of a .. truer truth", a more representative 
truth, for women. There is no question chac Lloyd and Braidotci wrice differenrly, chink 
differencly, and hold significancly different posirions on, for example, psychoanalysis, 
postscructuralism, and ocher significant philosophical issues. But this makes the 
question of how to understand their commonalities all the more intriguing to try and 
answer. 
Toward answering chis, first we might note that a radical approach to critique, or the 
determination to subject every element of reason to criticism, is not itself irrational. On 
the contrary, che unwillingness ro engage ins uch a. radical critique as a matter of principle 
is a form of dogmatism. There are, however, serious problems chat such a fundamental 
critique must address. If reason is fundamentally and irretrievably patriarchal, what can 
replace it other than arationaliry? And what is the rational status of the critique itself: 
isn'rt it caught within a debilitating circularity of using reason against itself? These 
problems are neither compelling nor unique co feminise work: they have beset every 
project of critique from Kant through to the Frankfurt School. It might take another 
paper to adequately explore them, but if we dispense with the incommensurabilicy thesis 
they immediately appear much less serious. That is, no critique of reason can actually 
understand itself as operating from completely outside the traditions of rational discourse. 
To some extent, therefore, all such critiques will be immanent, which dispenses with the 
need to show that one is appealing to strategies of legitimation entirely outside reason 
unless one is championing aracionalicy. 
Alasdair Macintyre, working very much within the Western Aristotelian traditions 
that both Nussbaum and Lovibond prize, has developed an account of rationality as 
essentially historical and socially concext,bound which can make sense of the feminist 
critique. In Whose Justice! Which Rationality? Macintyre endeavors to make sense of the 
fact that every set of cognitive standards emerge from and are a part of a particular social 
history, and chat they inescapably gain their legitimation precisely from this context, in 
their ability to "transcend the limitations and provide remedies for the defects of their 
predecessors within the history of that same tradition. "28 This sort of historicist meta, 
philosophy, or historicist account oflegitimation, is today a position considered reasonable 
within philosophy of science (Lakatos) and even influential within epistemologies of the 11
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social sciences. Ab.solute relanvism, the collapse of truth co ideolom . and che repudiation 
of all reasoned appeals do nor follow from a htSroricisc account, since. as I have been 
arguing, to locate an epistemology or a concept of reason in a social history i(and rhus. 
following Maclnryre, co understand it as a tradition) is not to say that it cannot 
unde·rstand or communicate \\rich other traditions, that it shares no common ground 
";th them upon which it can criticize their positions or learn from them how its own 
positions are limited. Nor does it follow that nothing we say represents the real. 
What does follow is that reason is not timeless, and that we cannoc d ismiss out ofhand 
an external critique which would explore the threads of connection between a social 
context like patriarchy and colonialism and the epistemic systems that grew ouc of this 
soil. If epistemologies are legitimated through their ability co provide remedies for 
currently existing problems, we need co explore what problems Enlightenment 
epistemologies sol.ved, and we need to be prepared co look beyond the explicit content 
of the canonical debates over knowledge to see the social and political contexts in which 
these debates became so imponanc and so influential. 
Given this convergence between feminise critique and other critique and explorations 
of the limitations of reason, such as in Macintyre 's weU,respected work, one begins to 
wonder why feminists have been singled ouc for their/our disloyalty to the tradition. In 
order to answer this we are led w a second point that would be helpful in underscanding 
the consistency between the reformist and radical wing of che feminise cririque. If we 
must begin to acknowledge that forms of rationality (this is the type of wording 
Macintyre counsels, in order co signify the plurality and variability of reasons) are 
embedded within history, we must also acknowledge that reasoned argument is only a 
part of whac is contained in ours or any other philosophical writings. What I am referring 
to here is che need co repair che Philosophy/Rhetoric split we all intoned in graduate 
school as the primary legitimation for philosophy, chat is, philosophy's distinctiveness 
from and superiority over writing which aims primarily to persuade, which appeals to 
emotion, which supplants aesthetic for logical criteria, or which conceals from view its 
ideol.ogical content or overriding strategic aim. My suspicion is that it is this part of our 
tradition that most philosophers will have trouble critiquing, for ic is just this part that 
Braidocti openly contests and thac Lovibond believes can be relinquished only at chc 
peril of our profession. And moreover, I would argue that it is this aspect of the feminist 
critique of reason which is most "gendered" in that it threatens mind, body dualism and 
endangers the self,understanding of philosophy as a fonn of manly control (with control 
over) the forces of emotion, desire, and power associated historically with an essentially 
chaotic and female nature. 
The canonical demarcation between philosophy and rhetoric turned on the issue of 
truth. On Plato's account, rhetoric merely delivers a truth that has already been 
discovered; ic cannot itself contribute to the discovery of truth. Thus it is style without 
substance, an inessential and often obfuscating dress lain over the truth substance which 
philosophical argument achieves. And as a fonn of dress, or even fashion, rhetoric comes 
in for all of Plato's criticisms of seductive practices aimed at deceit associated strongly 
although not exclusively with women. Indeed, as Susan Jarratt has shown, when men 
attempt to manipulate language toward the goal of persuasion-as in rhetorical 
oratory-they bring themselves down co the level of women who manipulate their 
external appearance coward the goal of seduction. 29 In both cases, the enchanting 
surface appearance conceals a process of manipulation and often further conceals the 
tru ch, i.e. , the "real" appearance of the woman or the "real" epistemic status of the claims 12
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being advanced. Rheconc is thus analogous co the cosmeuc arts as pnnnpalh orgam:ed 
toward decepcion rather than the attamtment of truth. (If you wonder why so many 
philosophers wnce badly tlus Vlew certainly explains it: dull. spare wnnng becomes a 
virtue in an ascetic value system which spurns all anenuon m style) .  
This accounc actually presents us with rwo ways ro understand the relationship of 
rhetonc to truth. To the extent that rhetoric is merely a delivery of already discovered 
truth, it adds nothing co the philosophical enterprise of truth see king. To che ,excenc char 
rhetoric worlc.s to persuade through deception, it is an obstacle to philosophy that must 
be sharply discredited and exposed. In both cases, it is entirely distinct from philosophy. 
Needless to say, Plaro's contemporanes who were engaged in rhetonc held a different 
view of the nature of their discursive practice. For the Sophists. rhetoric was not merely 
sryle without substance, buc the accual means to truth, which they defined differently 
than Plato. Famously for Plaro, truth referred co a realm entirely rran.scendenc of the 
human realm, transcendent of the temporality and changeableness that material reality 
cannot esca(k. For the Sophi.st.s, on the other hand, truth is the outcome of human 
perception and discourse, and is established through disputation. In contrast co Plato's 
transcendental conception of truth, the Sophist'.s conception suggests an immanent, 
non-absolute definition of truth. JO 
The Sophistic epistemologic.al claims about the intrinsic relationship between discourse 
and truth can find resonance in contemporary ,consensus theories of truth (Peirce, 
Habermas) and philosophies of science that locate che scientific communiry as the final 
arbiter over scientific truth claims (Kuhn) . The ontology of truth to which these theories 
are committed is not necessarily anci-realist. Understanding truth as immanent relocates 
the reference of truth claims to a fully contextualized material reality rather than a 
decontexruaJized transcendent realm. Putnam's internal realism may be the most fully 
developed account of such a view that explains (successfully, in my opinion) why it 
deserves the title .. realist. "11 
However, my main interest in the Sophist's claims about truth for this paper does not 
concern these epistemological and metaphysical issues so much as the metaphilosophical 
issues raised by the claim that rhetoric is necessarily a part of truth�seeking discourse. I 
will try to flesh these issues out and then turn to see how they are developed in some works 
of feminist philosophy. 
As Dilip Pararneshwar Gaonkar has explained, "the 'rhetorical turn' refers to the 
growing recognition of rhetoric in contemporary thought .. .lt means that the special 
sciences are becoming increasingly rhetorically self-conscious. They are beginning to 
recognize that their discursive practices, both internal and external, contain an unavoidable 
rhetorical content. "32 Gaonkar warns against overestimating the scope of rhetoric, or 
overvaluing rhetoric as the ground of discourse. But he agrees with Derrida that even 
if we take Plato's point that rhetoric is always only a supplemem: rather than the ground 
of discourse, the !history of this supplement may be of more ultimate interest "than the 
history of that which is in need of a supplement.1133 
What happens if philosophy were to become more rhetorically self-conscious? What 
would this mean for philosophy's pursuit of truth as its highest aim? Dominick LaCapra 
has offered a useful discussion of this related issue for history, which is also a tru th,seeking 
discipline, showing that an incorporation of rhetorical understanding is not in necessary 
contradiction to history's overarching concern for truth. 
Rhetoric involves a dialogical understanding of discourse and of "truth" 
itself in contrast to a monological idea of a unified authorial voice providing 
an ideally exhaustive and definitive (total) account of a fuUy mastered object 
13
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of knowledge ... .  che concept of che dialogical situates thac of persuasion m 
a larger discursive context. �'ichin this contexc, a .. convt:-rsation'' wich the 
past involves rhe hisrorian in argument and even polemic-both w1rh 
others and within rhe self--over approaches co understanding rhat are 
bound up wirh institutional and polmcal issues. }4 
Within philosophy, Gadame r's philosophical hermeneuc1cs offers 1usc such a d1alogical 
model of truth. Here, rhe positivist model of knowing in which an acrivc knowing agent 
confronts a passive object is reconceptualized as a conversation berween participants all 
of whom have their own horizon or interpreti,·e perspective. Textual documents and 
objects of knowledge, to the extent they are delimited and idenufied as objects of 
knowledge through historical processes of inquiry, carry forth their own horizons of 
meaning. Knowing, then, requires not so much the discovery of a pristine face but the 
fusion of horizons into a maximally comprehensive and coherent whole. 
On this conversational or dialogical model (whkh may well involve more than rwo 
participants), a rhetorical self-consciousness leads. us back to the sophistic account of 
truth. If truth is the contingent product (that is, within history rather chan transcendent 
of history) of an incerpretive, dialogical process, it becomes easier co see how rhetoric can 
contribute to the attainment of truth rather than being an inessential or olbfuscating 
supplement. If truth is understood as the product of an argument (involving cwo or more 
participants), then all the contributing elements of that argument need to be analyzed 
within an epistemological characterization of its results. 
The major shift involved here is a localization of truch to a specific context and away 
from a transcendental, ahistorical model. And chis has been the stumbling block to 
understanding both the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy and berween 
reason and the body. How can rhetoric, even when it is understood on the Aristotelian 
model as a science that is attentive co the particular, material context of debate, 
contribute to the attainment of a philosophical truth defined by its transcendence of that 
context? Jarratt suggests that the sophistic ontology of truth is based on a kind of 
materialist anthropology rather than a metaphysi.cs. By this she means that truth is 
contingent on the relations of knowers as these are constituted within a particular, 
material context, not in the sense that the content of the truth claim may be about these 
relations, but in the sense that the truth,status of any claim cannot transcend this 
particular context. In rhetoric, the knower makes arguments, or moves in the language 
game, based on her assessment of its likely effects on her particular interlocutors or co, 
discussants. In philosophy, traditionally understood, we are not supposed to aim at 
persuasion as the highest good, but at truth. To misunderstand the distinction (a 
distinction which exists in principle even if not always in fact) between a persuasive 
argument and a valid argument is to risk distorting the truth seeking process. But if truth 
is nor separable from the dialogical process within which it emerges, then the rules of 
philosophical argument and of conversational argument (or persuasion) begin to merge. 
For example, we might want to take into account the background of our partner in 
dialogue in terms of expressing meaning, knowing that the meaning s/he will hear 
through our words will partly be affected by her or his own horizon of in terpreta ti on. And 
to the extent meaning is connected to truth, this process will not be irrelevant to 
assessing either the justification or truth,status of our claims. 
A further point of conjuncture LaCapra highlights between rhetoric and history is 
likewise relevant for philosophy. This involves the question of reading texts. He notes 
the tendency of professional historians to see texts as documents in the 
narrow sense of the word and, by the same token, to ignore the textual 
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d111lens1onsof documents chemselves, that i.s, the manner m wh1chdocumentS 
"process" or rework matenal m ways mrtmacely bound up with larger 
sociocultural and political processes ... Nor are we inclined to raise the more 
"rheconcal" quesuon of how texts do whac they do--how, for example, they 
may sicuace or frame whac they "represent"' or inscribe (social dLScourses, 
paradigms, generic conventions, stereotypes, and so forth). The mulc1ple 
roles of tropes, irony, parody, and other .. rhe1torica1" devices of composition 
and arrangement generate resistances to the consrrual of texts in cerrns of 
their "representational" or narrowly documentary functions, and they 
disclose how texts may have critical or even potenually transformative 
relations co phenomena "represented" in them. l) 
The philosophical canon is disanalogous from the cype of hiscorical documents 
LaCapra is referring co here, documents such as census reports, legal transcripts, birth 
records, and so forth. And yet our canon is nonetheless rife with the rhetorical devices 
LaCapra lists as well as with che multiple relationships ro their purported representational 
content. These elements wilJ not be revealed by an exclusive aetencion co a texes 
propositional claims, but will need an attentiveness also to its choice of metaphor, 
imagery, conventions, ecc., all of which may suggest a subtext that may or may not 
conform to the explicit argument of the essay. And these are not asides co a philosophical 
dispensarion of che text, but crucial co understanding its full meanirlg, its dominant 
interpretations and persuasive effect, even to its canonization. 
In The Philosophical Imaginary, Michele LeDoeuff explores several canonical 
philosophical texts for whac she calls cheir textual unconscious. Philosophy defines itself 
by a contrast precisely to the rhetorical devices LaiCapra mentions as well as to images, 
poetry, myths, and fables. When these appear irl philosophical rexes, they are said co be 
there only for embellishment, for illustration of a claim rather than standing for a claim 
itself. However, LeDoeuff argues, and succeeds in showing, that philosophy cannot do 
without these elements: they spring up constantly as unsupported premises, and prop up 
other premises in the text, creating a kind of repressed and unsayable textual unconscious 
to which LeDoeuff means to refer by the concept of the philosophical imaginary. Thus, 
the philosophical imaginary is constituted by a set of images central to the functioning 
of philosophy that it cannot itself acknowledge. This, she suggests, is the shameful or 
inadequate face of philosophy: its inability to reflect on its own modes of discourse. 
Philosophy projects che imaginary as either ics precondition-the primitive, the child, 
or the infantile which exists prior to philosophical thought-or as its pedagogic device­
ics means co translate philosophical conclusions for an untrained audience. Thus it 
attempts co dominate the whole field of theory and non,theory: it recognizes the 
existence of non,theory but considers itself in charge of assessing non, theory as well as 
the master of theory. But on LeDoeuff s account, the philosophical imaginary, which can 
be ascertained in any given philosophical text, represents desire and affect, over which 
philosophy can never gain total control. Her view is not that philosophy is reducible to 
desire, but that philosophy is inextricably bound up with desire. 
The specific form chat the philosophical imaginary will take for any given specific text 
arises from four elements: ( 1) the internal needs of the particular philosophical enterprise; 
(2) the psychical needs of philosophers and their readers; (3) the sociological, i.e., 
historical and cultural, context; and (4) the trajectory of images in a historical succession 
of texts, that reveal a text's debt to other sources. Thus, the philosophical imaginary does 
philosophical work, in developing, justifying and clarifying an argument and not simply 
delivering it. The imagery of a text works to justify premises that the explicit philosophical 
15
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Thus, LeDoeuff disputes the norion that these subtextual elements are simply the 
expression of a "primitive soul" or "pre-cultural, pre-historical desire,, which commentators 
from Jung to Paglia have believed co be operative within philosophy. Rather, on 
LeDoeuff s account, the philosophical imaginaf)' "copes "irh problems posed by the 
cheoretical enterprise itself' and thus cannot be characterized as something essentially 
other-than-philosophy. 
LeDoeuff s most compelling reading is of Thomas More's Utopia, which she interprets 
th.rough a focus on More's choice of the island as a metaphor for a utopian sociery. This 
island imagery reveals that More's vision is not in fact a political vision: it is a vision of 
self#sufficiency, of independence, without external influence or engagement. It is thus 
an insular utopia, a solitary, non-object-related introversion, where the pleasure is a 
pleasure of undisturbed tranquiliry, what she names a primary narcissism. The island of 
ucopia is like the mirage of individual autonomy, where the "free" individual is completely 
alone, with its umbilical cord (to the isthmus) cue. This is not a policies: there is no theory 
of external relations, nor even of friendship. The version of utopia thus produced has 
total closure, a closure maximized inversely to the elimination of social relations. Thus, 
LeDoeuffs reading produces an inversion of More's own vision from utopia to dystopia. 
I want to suggest that this reading is not outside the domain of reasoned analysis. Reading 
More's Utopia through a focus on its metaphors and imagery is not the only way to read 
the text, nor does LeDoeuff argue that hers is the privileged reading. Bue it is one 
approach to mining the content of the cext that philosophy has traditionally castigated 
as irrelevant. And it reveals that the traditional segregation between rhetoric and 
philosophy is a delusion. 
Neither science nor philosophy works entirely through logical entailments between 
factually based claims. Part of the way in which models and hypotheses are judged as 
worthy of experimental pursuit or philosophical plausibiliry involves coherence, analogy, 
and metaphor. And surely the most ubiquitous metaphor of all involves gender. Even 
in English, which does nor gender its nouns in the way that frenc h and spanish do, there 
are many gendered associations: mother earth, boats, ships and hurricanes are female, as 
is the sea, justice, and so on. And there are dozens of cliche phrases in the academy such 
as ''the penetrating argument," "the thrust of an argument," a "rigorous critique," "erect 
a deferue," a "seminal work." These phrases work precisely in the way LeDoeuff suggescs 
in so far as they invoke unsupported premises that work to offer supporc for other premises 
in the text. If one is in doubt that phallocentrism exists, one need only read Saul Kripke, 
for whom the ulcimate, fixed, and essential meanings of words are always determined by 
what he calls "rigid designators." 
As Eva Feder Kittay explains, metaphors help to elucidate meaning through making 
an association between two different thingsi they thus perform an act of mediation, 
which changes the term thus mediated. 36 Hegel argued that, in the master slave dialectic, 
the slave's subjectivity is mediated through labor, that in creating a new objecc a new 
serue of self is produced in the slave. Moreover, the slave's recognition of the master's 
status as master mediates the master's own sense of self, and thus the master's relation 
to himself. De Beauvoir carried this idea forward to male/female relations: a man is made 
to feel stronger, larger, more intelligent, when paired with a relatively smaller, weaker, 
dependent woman. In this way mediation transforms the self, and gender dimorphism 
is selected for in the species. 
Metaphors in language can also perform such an act of mediation, by structuring an 
unstructured conceptual domain. When we say of a fashion "it's hot" we transfer the 16
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semantic relat ions berween hot and cold to those between clothing sryles. When we say 
of an argument that it is seminal, penetrating or ngorous we transfer the semantic 
relations between masculine potency and impotence or between having an erection and 
being flaccid. 
The concept of woman mediates the relations between man and his ochers--orher 
men, nature, his own self. This is noc a reciprocal relation: women are defined in 
reference to men, as helpmeets, wives, mothers, caregivers of men. Men are not: defined 
to the same extent by their relations to women. Thus men do not figure as metaphors 
50 ofcen. Kiccay has developed a cypology of such gendered metaphors: ( 1 )  First, man 
locates himself in his domain in relationship to woman in her domain, but always 
according a greater value to the male activity. Thus Socrates the philosopher portrays 
himself as a midwife, but bringing forth universal truths rather than particular babies. (2) 
Second, man locates himself in his object world through a relation to women. Thus the 
city of Babylon is said to be the great whore, there for man's delight and temptation, and 
nature is, of course, a woman, trying to hide her secrets under her skirts. (3) And third, 
and most obvious, woman mediates the relationships between men, establishing their 
status vis,a,vis other men; the beautiful model on the arm of a high powered man is there 
for other men to see. Gang rape establishes bonds between men via the domination and 
subjugation of a woman. 
Kittay concludes from this that woman's usefulness as metaphor depends on the 
difference and lesser status of our activities. Our empowerment and our equal panicipation 
in male domains will make us less useful for the mediating function. In part I bring this 
up to flesh out some of the ways in which models and metaphors which carry political 
implications work within inquiry to make arguments persuasive, hypotheses plausible, 
and to provide a coded discourse which can make us comfortable (or not) with other 
inquirers. Kiuay's analysis also can help us understand why what might appear as trivial 
linguistic conventions (the subject of what today is called the pc wars) can have 
significant political meaning and effects. 37 Coherentist procedures of inquiry are neither 
arational nor unsusceptible to ideologically informed analogical arguments, such as those 
that Hnk beliefs about efficient methods of managing workers and master molecule 
theories, or between the patriarchal belief that there must be one ultimate head of a 
household and mono-causal genetic explanations ofbehavior. To make such connections 
is not to imply that reason is useless, but that we need much more complex accounts of 
how reason works. We need to learn to read on more than one level, to pay attention to 
language, imagery, metaphor, to do the kind of readings that both LeDoeuff and lrigaray 
(presumably on opposite sides of the reformist,conservative split) excel at, and that 
Andrea Nye provides in her hitstory of logic.38 As Nye says, such readings are not the 
whole story, and a reductionism to the "play of social and political forces" is not the 
conclusion. Bue these readings are a part of the story about reason and truth which we 
have left aside in our manly refusal to acknowledge the significance of a texts'' inevitable 
emotional and aesthetic elements. 
Braidotti reaches this conclusion through a psychoanalysis of philosophy itself. The 
argument is basically this: Traditional rationalism's declared supremacy over emotion 
and desire parallels the ego's attempt to wrest control over the unconscious. The illusion 
of the coherent, ego-dominant, rational subject depends on its ability to segregate and 
gain control over its irrational internal sibling; the ego must reign over the unconscious, 
the rational must reign over emotion and desire, and the mind must reign over the body. 
In the west at least, these associations became gendered, so that rationality required male 
dominance over women. Permeable borders between the rational and irrational 
17
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components of a subject, or a text, threaten the very possibility of racional control. 
Nussbaum, on my S)mptomatic readmg, would have us reincorporate emotion within 
our understanding of rationality, but after having done this her basic strategy would be 
co pronounce reason sufficiently degendered and universal. and once again in control. 
Why isn't this acceptable? For one thing, the narrative of opposition with the dark forces 
of corporealiry is likely co be reinscribed through another identity marker so that reason 
can retain its supremacist self,image; e.g., through whiteness, such that irrational. 
superstitious, "traditional" cultures are portrayed as the cenrral site of a discourse 
controlled by desire and myth against logic and truth. This scenario is of couTSe already 
in place, but the suggestion is that gender can be disentangled from modernist narratives 
about reason with the result of exempting white Anglo women only from the realm of the 
irrational abject. We need a larger analysis. 
Braidorti understands the modernist narrative associating reason and philosophy as 
ultimately founded on power.39 Thus, her critique of reason is chat it mistakenly 
represents itself as undetermined by power when in actuality the entire discourse is the 
linguistic enactment of an exclusionary hegemony enabled through violent agonistics 
structured and concealed under the guise of reason and logic. In this, Lovibond is right 
co point out chat Braidocti is appealing even to representational truth in her claim co 
know better than traditional philosophy what its discourse is actually about. 
But if Lovibond is right that Braidotti is still appealing to reason, this fact docs not 
disprove Braidottil's claim that it is not possible to :seek a theoretical discourse that will 
stand completely outside of power, that will enforce no exclusions and concain no 
elements having to do with desire and the will to maximize one's own sphere of 
effectiveness. To seek such a theory outside of power is a metaphysical mistake as well as 
the wrong political and epistemic aim: any discourse needs a true/false distinction. 
Given this, the better alternative is to reconfigure the relationship between power and 
theory, between the ego and the unconscious, between reason and its others, to 
acknowledge the instability of these categories and the permeability of their borders, and 
to develop a reconstructed notion of reason not as a mastery of an ego over the whole, 
but as including multiple forms and operating on many levels. This project is incorreccly 
interpreted as a reductionism of reason to unreason: it does not give unreason the total 
mastery. Bue it also rejects the zero,sum game of the law of non,contradiction or the 
mutual exclusiveness between corporeal power and desire and incorporeal rationality. 
Rationality does not need the manichaean epistemic ontology of an absolute truth, 
mastery over an abject unreason. It needs distinctions, between true and false, more and 
less rational, but these can be formulated differently through developing an account of 
the situatedness of truth and reason. 
I conclude therefore that the work of the radical feminists contributes to this project 
of reformulating reason by teaching us to read differently, to analyze logical relations 
between propositions alongside the silent invocatiions of word choice and the implicit 
arguments advanced by metaphor. They help us to develop a simultaneous attentiveness 
to the emotional content of a text alongside its surface pronouncements, without 
eliminating either from efficacy over meaning. 
This is how I would understand the coherence between the approaches that both 
Braidotti and Lovibond want to separate as reformist and radical: I see both as 
contributing to a reconstructed reason, internally heterogeneous in form and organizing 
principle, free from the defensive need to purify itself from corporeal intrusions heretofore 
known as sophistry, rhetoric, and emotion. Both of the so,called reformists and radicals 
are teaching us to read differently, as Annette Baier suggested we read Locke differently 18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol26/iss1/1
76 Lmda Manin Alcoff 
in that presidenna1 address, and as we learn to read dtlferencly, we learn ro underscand 
the development of meaning and the process of justi.ficauon m more complex ways. In 
reconfiguring if not repairing the philosophy/rhetoric divis10n, we can learn co read our 
own anxieties in the very m1dsc of our best arguments, and co mak.e disnnccions between 
anxieties and arguments char also recognizes rheu IIlterdependence . Even Martha 
Nussbaum's work would be included here, in her readings of lireracure as philosophy and 
of phdosophy as literature, as a comribution coward breaking down these disrinc cions and 
redrawing the map of rauonal chought. 
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